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RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AFTER SANTA FE
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. DOE:
TIME FOR A NEW STRATEGY
Steven W. Fitschen'
In this Essay, Steven Fitschen, President of the National Legal Foundation,
argues against the Supreme Court's ruling in Santa Fe Independent School District
v. Doe, and calls for a new strategy in litigating similar cases. Fitschen proposes
a "thirty-yearplan" because he believes that the current Court composition, which
he sees as driven by personal predilections rather than by precedent, was partly
responsible for the outcome ofSanta Fe. Fitschen argues that the current Court has
largely ignored Establishment Clause precedent, and that any new, effective
strategy will be slowly implemented The thirty-year plan calls for less perfunctory
reliance on free-exercise-as-free-speech strategy, and asserts that the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are really two sides of the same coin,
rather than in tension with each other. Fitschen also draws upon historical
arguments that although establishment of religion is prohibited by the First
Amendment, acknowledgment, accommodation, and even encouragement ofreligion
is not. The thirty-year plan will be successful when everything short of
establishment passes constitutional muster, and when mere acknowledgment,
accommodation, and encouragement are notfalsely characterized as establishment
by opponents. Fitschen is hopeful that a reminder of "historical reality," as
articulated by Justice Story, will make the thirty-year plan afeasible new strategy
for the future.
INTRODUCTION
I thoroughly enjoyed participating in William and Mary's Institute of Bill of
Rights Law's Student Symposium on February 21,2000. A particularly enjoyable
part of the Symposium was playing the part of a Supreme Court Justice in the
hypothetical jurisdiction of Wythe as we judged the final round of the Moot Court
Competition for first-year law students. The problem the students argued was based
upon a football prayer fact pattern. This fact pattern, in turn, was based loosely
upon the then-pending Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe' case.
Of course, since the Symposium, the Supreme Court has handed down its
* President of the National Legal Foundation; Instructor, Regent University School of
Law.
1 530 U.S. 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
decision in Santa Fe. From the point of view of my organization, the National
Legal Foundation, the decision was an unmitigated disaster. Explaining why we
disagree with the opinion will serve as a good vehicle to explain some of the
National Legal Foundation's views on Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
Before I begin this explanation, however, I would like to mention one other
aspect of the Symposium that will help the reader understand the National Legal
Foundation's approach to these issues. After the Symposium concluded, I had
several opportunities to interact with students who had attended. Perhaps the most
frequent sentiment I heard was amazement that the speakers representing each side
of the debate were not in full agreement with each other. In other words, students
were surprised that Steve Aden, of the Rutherford Institute, and I did not always
agree, and that Ellen Johnson, of American Atheists, and Elliot Mincberg, of People
for the American Way, did not always agree. In this age of polarized public
debates, both the "Religious Right" and the "Secular Left" are assumed to be
monolithic. The students found out otherwise.
Of course, those of us in these two camps know this about ourselves and our
opponents. However, it was refreshing to see students get a glimpse behind the
stereotypes and understand, at least in a small way, the different perspectives, not
only among opponents, but also among allies.
This point is also germane to my comments in this Essay. The view of the
National Legal Foundation on Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
jurisprudence matches that of many, if not all, of the other Religious Right public
interest law firms in some regards but also deviates from those views in other
regards. Thus, to return to the Santa Fe case, the National Legal Foundation would
agree with most Religious Right groups that one reason the case came out the wrong
way (from our perspective)2 stemmed from the current composition of the Court.
However, I also believe that, to a large extent, Santa Fe was a self-inflicted wound.
First, I will briefly address the issue of the current Court composition affecting
the outcome in Santa Fe. I believe that there can be no serious doubt that this
decision was driven by the personal predilections of the Justices. We cannot say
that the Santa Fe decision was driven by precedent. First, the Supreme Court,
during the last two terms, has shown no intention of being bound by Establishment
Clause precedent. During the October 1996 term, in Agostini v. Felton,3 the Court
2 One of the nice things about participating in a symposium and writing an essay is the
greater linguistic freedom these formats offer over law review articles. As was obvious to
all who attended the Symposium, the panel was composed of two members of the "Religious
Right" and two members of the "Secular Left." All four of us represent "movement"
organizations. Therefore, it should go without saying that when I describe a case as coming
out the "wrong way" or make similar statements of judgment, I am representing the
institutional position of my organization.
' 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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overruled Aguilar v. Felton,4 in whole, and School District of GrandRapids v. Ball,'
in part.6 In the October 1999 term, the same term in which Santa Fe was decided,
the Court in Mitchell v. Helms7 overruled, in part, Meek v. Pittenger,8 and Wolman
v. Walter.9 This should be no surprise, because the Court and various individual
Justices have routinely and roundly criticized their own Establishment Clause
jurisprudence."0
However, even if the Court was not willing to overturn any more of its
precedents-namely, Lee v. Weisman," the graduation prayer case-it easily could
have decided Santa Fe correctly. While this Essay is not the place to pursue an in-
depth case analysis, it suffices to say that Santa Fe was easily distinguishable from
Lee, and the Court could have accepted Santa Fe's argument that the Does' facial
challenge should have failed." Finally, we must wonder why the Court reached out
for the football prayer issue, when the opinion in the case below dealt almost
exclusively with graduation prayers. 3
I. THE SELF-INFLICrED WOUND
The National Legal Foundation would agree with most Religious Right groups
that under a proper Establishment Clausejurisprudence, Santa Fe would have come
out the other way. We would also agree that with the current makeup of the Court,
we are not likely to get a properj urisprudence. However, I also believe that in other
respects, Santa Fe was a self-inflicted wound. This is where the National Legal
Foundation parts company with some of our allies. This is just one example of
how, as the students observed, the Religious Right is not rhonolithic.
In particular, I think it has been a mistake to posture free exercise claims and
defenses as free speech cases. This was a deliberate tactic on the part of some of
my colleagues. The idea was this: the Court was composed of Justices such as
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Both these Justices and the holdings of free
4 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
' 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
6 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236.
7 530 U.S. 
___, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2555 (2000).
8 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
9 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
" As just one example of the Court's self-criticism, see Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District., 508 U.S. 384, 397-401
(1993) (summarizing much of the criticism to that date).
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
12 See Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in the case for an able discussion of both of
these points. See Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2285-87 (2000).
" See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1999), affd, 530
U.S.__, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
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exercise cases were against us. However, these Justices saw themselves as
champions of free speech. Therefore, we should litigate under the Free Speech
Clause. The theory has a natural attraction. After all, much of the exercise of
religion does involve speaking.
However, the fly in the ointment was that these Justices would never go near
anything that smacked of establishment. This would prove a special problem in the
context of religion in the public schools. Therefo re, the strategy that was advanced
drew a distinction between student-led, student-initiated speech and all other types
of speech. Inherent in this strategy-at least some versions of it-mwas to throw in
the towel on school board members', superintendents', teachers', administrators',
and support staff's religious speech.
This strategy seemed to work at first. In fact, this strategy was given a boost by
a case that the National Legal Foundation won at the United States Supreme Court.
In her opinion in the Bible club case, Board of Education of the Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens,"4 Justice O'Connor wrote that
there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect. We think that secondary school students are mature enough and
are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student
speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis. 5
In the Mergens case, the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act was upheld. 6
This victory has led to the formation of thousands of Bible clubs on public school
campuses throughout the United States.' In Mergens, we made free speech
arguments. However, we made those arguments because the Equal Access Act
itself spoke in terms of free.speech. The entire case revolved around the Act's
14 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
11 Id. at 250.
16 See id. at 253.
" Letter from Doug Tegner, National Coordinator, Challenge 2000, to Steven W.
Fitschen, President, National Legal Foundation 1 (Nov. 9,2000) (on file with author). In his
letter, Tegner documents 14,268 clubs that have voluntarily registered with Challenge 2000
and been added to its database. He also explains that approximately 1,000 more clubs need
to be added from hard copy records. In addition, Tegner estimates, based upon the work of
his organization over the past four years, that between 20,000 and 23,000 additional clubs
have not yet registered with Challenge 2000. Tegner also estimates that as many as fifty
percent of all clubs have been created in the past two years alone. See id; see generally
EverySchool Alliance, available at http://www.christianity.com/everyschool (last visited
Jan. 25,200 1) (an online database that contains a national listing of student-led Bible clubs).
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phrase "limited open forum.".
The strategy achieved its -most common form after Lee v. Weisman9 and the
Jones v. Clear Creek lindependent School District cases. After the Supreme Court
held that a graduation prayer delivered by a member of the clergy under the
direction of a school policy was unconstitutional in Lee, the Court dealt with the
case of Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District (Clear Creek 1).21 This
case, which came out of the Fifth Circuit, involved a policy that permitted student-
led, student-initiated prayers at graduation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with Lee." In the second
hearing of the case (Clear Creekfl)," the Fifth Circuit distinguished Lee and upheld
the policy under both Lemon v. Kurtzman24 and Lee." When the plaintiffs appealed
the decision on remand, the Court refused to grant certiorari,26 thus preserving what
looked like a victory for the free-exercise-as-free-speech strategy.
However, the seeming victory actually. contained the seeds of several other
problems. First, the policy upheld in Clear Creek II required any student-led,
student-initiated prayers to be "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing."27 This requirement
was problematic from several points of view. To many religious groups, including
the National Legal Foundation, the requirement itself seemed unconstitutional.
From our point of view, no school had any business telling a student he could not
pray in Jesus' name" and the words "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing ' 9 certainly
had the potential to be interpreted to mean that. Of course, there was always the
possibility that a court would some day say that praying in Jesus' name was,. in fact,
nonsectarian, nonproselytizing. After all, simply because someone acknowledges
Jesus as his Lord does not mean that he is proselytizing. Similarly, there was
Is Mergens, 496 U.S. at 234-47.
19 505 U.S. 577, 599 (5th Cir. 1992).
20 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991); 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
21 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991) (Clear Creek 1).
22 See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
23 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (Clear Creek 11).
24 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25 See Clear Creek II, 977 F.2d at 963.
26 See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 967 (1993).
27 Clear Creek II, 977 F.2d at 963.
28 I use the example of praying in Jesus' name for several reasons. First, in addition to
being a public interest law firm, the National Legal Foundation is a Christian ministry. This
does not mean that we accept only Christians as clients. However, the vast majority of our
clients are Christians. We do what we do because we are interested in furthering the Gospel.
However, for purposes of this Essay, there are two other reasons why prayers in Jesus' name
are a more appropriate example. First, these are the types of prayers at issue in the cases I
will discuss. Second, I will be interacting with a view of the Establishment Clause that
specifically addresses the relationship between the state and Christianity.
29 Clear Creek I1, 977 F.2d at 963.
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always hope that some court somewhere would declare that prayers in Jesus' name
were not sectarian. While this did not seem likely in the current judicial climate,
there were certainly historical and linguistic arguments that would support such a
conclusion.3°
Thus, absent such a court declaring that prayers in Jesus' name were
nonsectarian, nonproselytizing, we were concerned about the precedent. However,
we were also concerned that schools all across the country were voluntarily using
the Clear Creek IIpolicy as a model. While we were glad to see that many schools
were trying to do the right thing by instituting policies permitting graduation
prayers, we were concerned about the nonsectarian, nonproselytizing requirement.
Furthermore, Clear Creek!! contained the germ of a second problem. So long
as the Supreme Court refused to overturn Lemon, one had to question whether the
nonsectarian, nonproselytizing requirement could pass Lemon's excessive
entanglement prong if such a case ever made it to the Supreme Court. True, the
Fifth Circuit said the Clear Creek II policy did pass the prong. And, true, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Still, one had to wonder about a potential future
case. The Clear Creek II court's analysis did not seem convincing on this point,
even to those of us who were friends of graduation prayer. After all, how could a
school enforce a nonsectarian, nonproselytizing requirement--of either the type that
allowed or that disallowed prayers in Jesus' name-without evaluating student
prayers? Very conceivably, a court could hold such an evaluation to be an
excessive entanglement.
The putative free-exercise-as-free-speech "victory" in Clear CreeklIcontained
yet another potential pitfall. The Mergens-Lee-Clear Creek I trilogy of cases
handed the opponents of student-initiated, student-led prayers their answering
argument on a silver platter. Clear Creek !I quoted the language from the National
Legal Foundation's Mergens case that I mentioned earlier:
There is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect. We think that secondary school students are mature enough and
are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student
speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.3
The obvious argument is to persuade courts that students are state actors.
30 For plausible historical argument, see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. For
plausible linguistic arguments, see infra text accompanying note 33 for a modem court
noting that, even with the mention of a specific deity, a prayer could be nonproselytizing.
"3 Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (quoting Jones v. Clear Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (Clear Creek 11)).
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While the student-as-state-actor argument is the obvious way to proceed in light
of the Mergens-Lee-Clear Creek II trilogy, the argument, to people on my side of
this issue, is both ludicrous and offensive. Speaking from a personal perspective,
four of my five children are school-aged and attend public schools. Without trying
to be melodramatic, I find the proposition that my children could be considered state
actors simply because they utter a prayer over a school-owned public address
system to be nothing less than outrageous. Nonetheless, we have to deal with what
we know the other side will argue. Thus, at the Symposium, all of the speakers--on
both sides of the issue--concurred that the Santa Fe case would turn on whether the
Court characterized the prayers that might occur under the school district's policy
as private speech or government speech. Now, with the advantage of hindsight, we
know that the Court did characterize the prayers as government speech.32
In sum, for someone like me (who believes that graduation prayers and other
religious expression in the public schools are constitutionally sound but does not
like the free-exercise-as-free-speech strategy), there were two issues. First, would
any court ever allow prayers in Jesus' name under the nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing standard? Second, what would happen if the Supreme Court
accepted the student-as-state-actor argument? Amazingly enough, Santa Fe
represented, initially, the best possible scenario and, ultimately, the worst possible
scenario.
First, let us examine the best case scenario. Given the fact that the free-
exercise-as-free-speech strategy as applied to the public school setting deliberately
drew the line between student speech and all other speech, the best case scenario
would be a decision that allowed prayers in Jesus' name, and did not allow the
school to examine the prayer for content. This scenario would get us past the
nonsectarian, nonproselytizing requirement, and it would pass muster under
Lemon's excessive entanglement prong. This is exactly what the district court did
in the SantaFe case. As I mentioned earlier, before this case reached the Supreme
Court, it also involved graduation prayers. As summarized by the Fifth Circuit:
the district court ruled that, consistent with SFISD's [Santa Fe
Independent School District's] October Policy and our decision in Clear
Creek II, student-selected, student-given, nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
invocations and benedictions would be permitted, and that such
invocations and benedictions could take the form of a
"nondenominational prayer." Although cautioning that SFISD should
play no role in selecting the students or scrutinizing and approving the
content of the invocations and benedictions, the district court went on to
note gratuitously that "generic prayers to the 'Almighty,' or to 'God,' or
to 'Our Heavenly Father (or Mother),' or the like, will of course be
32 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. _, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2275 (2000).
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permitted. Reference ,to. any particular deity, by name, such as
Mohammed, Jesus, Buddha, or the like, will likewise be permitted, as
long as the general thrust of the prayer is nonproselytizing, as required
by [Clear Creek I]."'
From the National Legal Foundation's perspective, this was as good as it could
get. 4 Although we believe that the strategy was wrong as a matter of first
principles, the district court had arrived at the right result: prayers in Jesus' name
were permissible at graduation and sporting events.
However, by the time the Supreme Court finished with the case, we had moved
from the best case scenario to the worst case scenario. After a brief description of
the factual and procedural history of the case," Justice Stevens delivered a
devastating blow to the free-exercise-as-free-speech strategy. However, I must add
that Santa Fe held the school district's policy unconstitutional. 6 It did not address
individual student prayers that may be uttered outside the mechanism of a policy.
Thus, some of my colleagues may continue to pursue the old strategy. However, I
would hope that some, at least, will begin to realize that we should switch to a more
principled, less pragmatic strategy.
Whether or not Justice Stevens' opinion persuades any of my colleagues to
switch strategies, we must at least note just how thorough a repudiation of this
strategy he delivered. Early in the opinion, Justice Stevens clearly articulated which
side of the private speech/government speech divide he would come down on:
In this case the District first argues that this principle is inapplicable to
its October policy because the messages are private student speech, not
public speech. It reminds us that "there is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses protect." Board of Ed of Westside
Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)
(opinion of O'Connor, J.). We certainly agree with that distinction, but
3 Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 811 (1999) (emphasis added) (second
alteration in original).
"' Actually, at an earlier point, the school district had tried to abandon the "nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing" requirement as well. See Id at 812.
" Because Justice Stevens found the policy unconstitutional on other grounds, he never
addressed what types of prayers might be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. However, he
did make the effort to point out that many of the prayers were prayed in Jesus' name. Santa
Fe, 530 U.S. _, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2272-73, n.2, 7 (2000).
36 See id. at 2283.
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we are not persuaded that the pregame invocations should be regarded
as "private speech." ' -
Next, he laid out another buzz saw that the free-exercise-as-free-speech strategy
would run into. Because Santa Fe was being postured as a speech case, the policy
had to stand up to forum analysis. In Justice Stevens' view, it could not: ,"The
Santa Fe school officials simply do not evince either by policy or by practice, any
intent to open the [pregame ceremony] to indiscriminate use, .. by the student
body generally."3"
If Justice Stevens' opinion did not mark the beginning of the end for the free-
exercise-as-free-speech strategy, it certainly severely limited its range of
applicability when he wrote that
in light of the school's history of regular delivery of a student-led prayer
at athletic events, it is reasonable to infer that the specific purpose of the
policy was to preserve a popular "state-sponsored religious practice."
Lee, 505 U.S., at 596.
School sponsorship of a religious message is impermissible because
it sends the ancillary message to members of the audience who are
nonadherents "that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying, message to. adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community." Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S., at 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
delivery of such a message--over the school's public address system, by
a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school
faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly
encourages public prayer-is not properly characterized as "private"
speech.39
At this point, I note that the National Legal Foundation. is not glad that the case
turned out as it did. Quite to the contrary, we believe that the prayer policy at issue
was absolutely constitutional. In fact, we filed an amicus brief in support of the
school district on behalf of twenty-one United States Senators and Congressmen.
Although we have believed for years that the free-exercise-as-free-speech strategy
was flawed, we derive no satisfaction from now being able to say, "We told you
so.,
Furthermore, I agree with the Justices who dissented in Santa Fe that the
3 Id. at 2275.
38 Id at 2276 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988))
(quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
39 Id. at 2279.
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majority opinion "bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life."40 As
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the dissenters:
Neither the holding nor the tone of the opinion is faithful to the meaning
of the Establishment Clause, when it is recalled that George Washington
himself, at the request of the very Congress which passed the Bill of
Rights, proclaimed a day. of "public thanksgiving and prayer, to be
observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal
favors of Almighty God."'
This is the same hostility, I might add, that was displayed by the "Secular Left"
members of our Symposium. Although I could point to comments made during the
Symposium, I refer instead to comments that are easily available to any reader of
this Essay through the People for the American Way and American Atheists'
websites. In the section of the American Atheists' site entitled "Schoolhouse, ' '42
Ellen Johnson's organization makes it abundantly clear that they would not be
happy -if only teacher and administrator prayers were eliminated. Rather, every
form of student prayer must also be wiped out. Of course, no legal arguments are
advanced in support of this radical agenda.
Elliot Mincberg's approach at least pays lip service to the fact that the
Establishment Clause is a prohibition on government, not private citizens. Thus,
the People For the American Way approach is the one discussed above: cast
students as state actors."3 For example, in a press release issued after the Santa Fe
decision was handed down, People For the American Way Foundation President
Ralph G. Neas stated, "[t]he Santa Fe school district tried to promote religion by
disguising it as neutral free speech, but the Court has unmasked the district's policy
for what it is--unconstitutional, school-sponsored, captive-audience prayer."'4
An additional example of People For the American Way's hostility does not
particularly implicate what this Essay has previously addressed. However, it bears
directly on the topic of religion in the public schools. It seems especially ironic in
light of Chief Justice Rehnquist's criticism of the Santa Fe majority's hostility.
People For the American Way is opposing the Lumpkin County, Georgia, School
Board's plan toteach respect for the Creator. In a press release, People for the
40 Id. at 2283 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2283-84 (quoting PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION, I MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, 1787-1897 64 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)).
" American Atheists, Prayer in Schools, available at http://www.atheists.org/
schoolhouse/#intro (last modified Sept. 24, 2000).
' See supra note 31-32 and accompanying text.
People for the American Way, Supreme Court Narrowly Upholds First Amendment
in Texas Football School Prayer Case, available at http://www.pfaw.org/news/press/
show.cgi?article--96 1437937 (June 19, 2000).
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American Way quote, in its entirety, a demand letter that Elliot wrote to the
Lumpkin County School Board.
45
In his letter Elliot admits that Georgia's new character education law, Title 20,
section 2-145(a) of the Georgia Code," requires each public school district to begin
teaching students certain character traits, specifically including ."respect for the
creator.'47 Nonetheless, Elliot goes on to tell the school board why, according to
his lights, the Lumpkin County plan would be unconstitutional, He writes:
The Constitution prohibits not only government practices that "aid one
religion... or prefer one religion over another," but also those practices
that "aid all religions" and therefore endorse religion over nonreligion.
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947). Accord, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1994).
There can be no legitimate question that teaching students to have
"respect for the creator" endorses religion over nonreligion and crosses
the required line of government neutrality toward religion. Such teaching
assumes and promotes the existence of a single "creator," an inherently
religious belief."' 8
The fact of the matter is that the Constitution does not ban practices that
endorse religion over irreligion-as Chief Justice Rehnquist's quotation of
President Washington's proclamation demonstrates. 9 Rather, it is the Supreme
Court's opinion in Everson (which Elliot quoted) that seeks to prohibit practices
that endorse religion over irreligion. I would simply remind Elliot that Supreme
Court opinions can be overruled.
In particular, Elliot demanded that the Georgia school board not post the
national motto, "In God We Trust." This is hostility at its most ludicrous.
41 See People for the American Way, Georgia School Board Urged to Respect the
Constitution by Cancelling Plans to Teach "Respect the Creator" in Public Schools,
available at http://www.pfaw .org/news/press//show.cgi?article--963 861980 (June 19,2000).
46 GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-145(a) (Supp. 1997-2000).
47 Id.
41 People for the American Way, Georgia School Board Urged to Respect the
Constitution by Cancelling Plans to Teach "Respect the Creator' in Public Schools,
available at http://www.pfaw.org/news/press//show.cgi?article--963861980 (June 19,2000).
49 1 recognize that a simple quotation from Washington does not "prove" the non-
preferentialist position. In fact, the literature is replete with arguments both for and against
this position. I feel quite certain that I could marshall all the best arguments and still not
persuade my co-panelist. I simply offer Rehnquist's recent comment here because it sets, in
strikingly stark contrast, the view of George Washington against that of People For the
American Way.
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Finally, I hasten to add that I do not think, given the current Court composition
and current precedent, Santa Fe would have been decided correctly under the
position that I am about to advocate. If, over the last fifteen years or so, more free
exercise cases had been litigated under the Free Exercise Clause ratherthan the Free
Speech Clause, the story might have been different. Of course, one cannot prove
what might have been. Even after fifteen years of what I would consider to be a
proper strategy, the school district still may have lost in Santa Fe. But we would
have been fifteen years closer to proper Establishment Clause and Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence.
1I. A NEW STRATEGY
I do not believethat the National Legal Foundation's approach would have
"saved the day" in the Santa Fe case. Rather, my appeal to my colleagues that have
preferred the free-exercise-as-free-speech strategy would be simply this: if this
strategy was adopted because other strategies were not working, is it not time to
recognize that, after SantaFe, the free-exercise-as-free-speech strategy is no longer
working? I would abandon it in favor of something that will bear long-term fruit.
I would recommend a strategy that would protect the free exercise rights, not
only of students, but of all people involved with schools. Indeed, the strategy works
beyond the school setting and implicates both the Free Exercise and the
Establishment Clauses. In some ways, it is not a new strategy. It is actually a
strategy that the National Legal Foundation and some of our colleagues have been
employing for years. However, it has been the minority approach.
As I had originally conceived of this Essay, its purpose was quite simple and
modest: to articulate the institutional positions of the National Legal Foundation
on the issue of religion in the public schools, as a follow up to the Symposium.
However, because Santa Fe has been decided in the interim between the
Symposium and the publication of this journal, and because the case compellingly
illustrates our fears about the free-exercise-as-free-speech strategy, this journal is
a fortuitous place to discuss the problems with that approach. The preceding
portion of this Essay has set the context for why we have adopted an approach that
is different from some, of our colleagues. Hopefully, it has also been of more
interest to readers on both sides of this debate than the Essay would have been as
originally conceived.
Let me clarify that our strategy is what we refer to, in-house, as a "thirty-year
plan." Quite frankly, we call our approach a thirty-year plan out of admiration for
many of our opponents. They have been willing to lose repeatedly in an effort to
somehow shift the legal thinking on a topic. What may be a great piece of rhetoric
in a dissenting opinion today and for years to come, may become great rhetoric in
a concurrence in ten years, which may become great dicta in twenty years, which
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may become the holding in the case that reverses years of bad precedent in thirty
years.
Right now, groups on our side of these issues should be heartened. As I
mentioned earlier in this Essay, the Supreme Court recently has overturned, in
whole or in part, Aguilar v. Felton, Grand Rapids v. Ball,5' Meek v. Pittenger,5 2
and Wolman v. Walter. 3
Because this is a thirty-year plan, our approach always tries to take into account,
as we phrase it, both "what is and what ought to be." The what is/what ought to be
distinction works itself out in various ways in our practice of law. First, it can
result in making arguments in the alternative. There are times when we will make
both free speech and free exercise arguments. However, there are times when we
will forego the free speech argument altogether. This points to another practical
outworking. We believe that, in some ways, our amicus work is as important as our
litigation. There are arguments that parties simply cannot emphasize or sometimes
make at all. Parties have less liberty to ignore the "what is" in favor of emphasizing
the "what ought to be."
We also often argue that the particular practice that is under attack in a case
passes muster under any of the up to five Establishment Clause tests which may be
applicable, including those we do not think are jurisprudentially sound. 4 So, for
example, while we might not be able to ignore Lemon, we would also argue that the
Marsh test or the coercion test should be applied.
These first two points really go hand-in-hand. The thirty-year plan is our way
of getting from what is to what ought to be. However, our approach is also
jurisprudentially driven. It is not just that we do not like the current state of affairs
and believe that any other state of affairs would have to be better. Rather, we have
strong feelings about "what ought to be."
First of all, we believe that the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause are simply two sides of the same coin. They are in no way in tension with
each other. Thus, we believe that one of the most important ways to protect the free
exercise of religion is to reverse the current, wrong-headed Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
I will take as a given for this discussion-the existence of the incorporation
10 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
5 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
52 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
11 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
14 These tests are familiar to any student of Establishment Clause jurisdiction: the
Lemon test (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (197 1)), the Marsh test (Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983)), the endorsement test from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), the coercion test from Justice Kennedy's dissent in
County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,662 (1989), and the psycho-coercion test from
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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doctrine. I will also take as my primary example the public school setting. Thus,
the question becomes, what may a school district do, for example, without violating
the Establishment Clause.
We believe that Justice Joseph Story was correct in his oft-quoted description
of the purpose of the religion clauses:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the
amendment to it, now under consideration, the general, if not the
universal, sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive
encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible with the
private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious worship. An
attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to
hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal
disapprobation, if not universal indignation."
Story went on to explain:
The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to
advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to
prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to
an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. 6
This is the historical reality, much to the dismay of the "Secular Left" members of
our Symposium panel.
Of course, if the state may encourage religion generally and Christianity
specifically, clearly the state may also acknowledge and accommodate religion.
This is the heart of the National Legal Foundation's position. Establishment of
religion was rightly prohibited by the First Amendment, but acknowledgment,
accommodation, and yes, even encouragement of religion was not prohibited. Quite
the contrary, these practices are a "duty" of governments according to Story."
Although these duties are not stated in the Constitution, they are not prohibited
either; indeed, a prohibited duty is oxymoronic. It is the people's prerogative to
elect public officials who will act on these duties. Any law or (if we accept a
constitutional gloss) any action by a state actor that acknowledges, accommodates,
or encourages religion should pass constitutional muster. Only those that go beyond
encouragement to establishment should be held unconstitutional. Establishment,
5' JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1868
(Arthur E. Sutherland ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1833).
56 Id. § 1871.
" See id. § 1870.
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of course, had a specific meaning under the First Amendment. Three variations of
establishment were known to Story and his contemporaries:
One, where a government affords aid to a particular religion, leaving all
persons free to adopt any other; another, where it creates an
ecclesiastical establishment for the propagation of the doctrines of a
particular sect of that religion, leaving a like freedom to all others; and
a third, where it creates such an establishment, and excludes all persons,
not belonging to it, either wholly, or in part, from any participation in the
public honours, trusts, emoluments, privileges, and immunities of the
state. 58
This is establishment. This is prohibited. Prayers by a student at a football game
are not.
We do not need to go through the gyrations about whether a student somehow
is transformed into a state actor, or what kind of forum exists. It does not matter
that the state owns the stadium or the public address system. The simple fact of the
matter is that no religion has been established.
Of course, because this is the historically correct position, the Secular Left has
to attack Story's view. The attack usually takes one of two forms: first, that this
is an antiquated idea, and second, that Story's is a view that only those in the
majority religion would expound. The first view is, represented by the recent Sixth
Circuit panel decision in ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board.59 In this case, the ACLU of Ohio sued the state of Ohio to enjoin the use of
its motto, "With God all Things are Possible. ' Judge Cohn writing for the
majority relegated Joseph Story to a footnote and summarily dispatched his view:
We have come a long way from when ... Justice Joseph Story could
say: "it is impossible for those, who believe the truth of Christianity, as
a divine revelation, to doubt, that it is the especial duty of government
to foster, and encourage it among all the citizens and subjects," Joseph
Story, Commentaries of [sic] the Constitution of the United States 723
(Vol. III, 1833) ......
The second objection, or something very close to it, was voiced during the
Symposium by Ellen Johnson.62 Ellen expressed concern that I was only advocating
8 Id. § 1866.
19 210 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000).
60 See id at 704.
61 Id. at 725 n.17.
62 See Unofficial Transcript Record of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law Student
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acknowledgment, accommodation, and encouragement of the majority religion.63
Let us look at each objection in turn. First, Judge Cohn undercuts his own
argument. In the same footnote in which he makes it seem that Story's view is a
mere relic of the past, he quotes an Oklahoma Supreme Court case from as recent
as 1959: "it is well settled and understood that ours is a Christian Nation, holding
the Almighty God in dutiful reverence.""
In fact, while courts may have backed away from explicitly stating that
Christianity can be favored, they have never backed away from the idea that
monotheism generally can be acknowledged, accommodated, and encouraged. Even
Supreme Court Justices have been unabashed in this regard. Just two of the many
available quotations will make the point. To start with the point most offensive to
the Secular Left--encouragement-Justice Douglas wrote:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being . . . When the state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For then
it respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the
public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be
to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a
callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe.6
In Marsh, the Court held that "[t]o invoke Divine guidance on a public body...
is not... an 'establishment' of religion ora step toward establishment; [but] simply
a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country.""
I turn now to the second objection, the one voiced by Ellen about majority and
minority religions. As the quotations from Justice Story demonstrate, the religion
clauses were designed to allow acknowledgment, accommodation, and
encouragement, but not establishment of Christianity.
Two points are relevant here. First, some may object that Story only wrote as
- he did because he was "part of the club." His religion was protected. Nothing
could be further from the truth. Joseph Story was a Unitarian, not an orthodox
Christian;67 however, he was intellectually honest enough to tell the truth about the
Division Symposium, Religion in Our Schools: A Debate on Freedom, at 36, lines 17-21.
63 See id
'6 See Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 725 n. 17 (quoting Oklahoma v. Williamson, 347 P.2d
204, 207 (1959)).
65 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (emphasis added).
66 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (emphasis added).
67 R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE
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meaning of the religion clauses. Today, members of minority religions and atheists
would serve the debate well by following Story's example. Be honest about the
meaning of the clauses, and, if you do not like what the Constitution says, try to
amend it.
The second relevant point is this: many people, even some members of
religious right groups, do not feel comfortable with the historic position embraced
by the National Legal Foundation. They believe that we should not ask for any
special status, but merely equal treatment. Interestingly enough, if we pursue
special treatment and lose, we may be able to hold the line at equal treatment. If we
start by asking for equal treatment and lose, we could end up with unequal treatment
and religious discrimination.
However, we would never advocate seeking special treatment for the reason just
mentioned. Rather, we advocate it because there is a very specific reason why the
drafters of the Bill of Rights drew the line where they did. These men, like the
Framers of the Constitution, were concerned about the interaction between
majorities and minorities in the body politic.
Today, we hear much about protecting the minority from the tyranny of the
majority. In support of this concern, The Federalist Papers are often invoked.
This, of course, is quite proper. The Federalist was concerned about the tyranny of
the majority over the minority. For example, in Federalist 51 we read, "[i]f a
majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be
insecure." The problem however, is that The Federalist was equally, if not more,
concerned about the tyranny of the minority over the majority. For example, in
Federalist 22 we read that the "fundamental maxim of republican government...
requires that the sense of the majority should prevail." 9
Thus, we must never safeguard against the one tyranny at the expense of
safeguarding against the other tyranny. It must be "both and," not "either or."
While the majority may seek to have its religion established, this would clearly
trample upon the minority. However, to insist that the majority-which sincerely
believes that governments and not just men should honor God-must voluntarily
violate that belief would just as clearly trample upon the majority. Drawing the line
at establishment protects each from the tyranny of the other.
At bottom, we believe that anyone, individual or government actor, can
participate in any religious activity, whether speech or action, as long as it does not
constitute an establishment of religion of the type described by Justice Story. The
only remaining question is how to get from what is to what ought to be. As
OLD REPUBLIC 180 (1985).
6s THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1, at 161 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 198 1).
6 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1981).
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mentioned above, there are five establishment clause tests,70 and the Supreme Court
has attacked its own Establishment Clause jurisprudence. What are we to make of
this jumbled mess and how do we fix things?
In light of the foregoing discussion, it should be obvious that the National Legal
Foundation has little use for the Lemon test. Ultimately, we would like to see the
Supreme Court revert to a test that simply examines whether one of the three types
of establishments described by Justice Story exists. Is it unrealistic to think that we
will ever get to that point? I don't think so. While Justice Kennedy's coercion test
from his opinion in Allegheny was in dissent and while he did not ever get quite to
the "pure" Story position, he got awfully close. Because I want to be fair with
Justice Kennedy's words, I will quote him at greater length than might otherwise
be warranted. This is especially important since many of us have wondered how
one man could have written as Kennedy did in Allegheny and as he did in Lee:
Rather than requiring government to avoid any action that acknowledges
or aids religion, the Establishment Clause permits government some
latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central role religion plays
in our society. Any approach less sensitive to our heritage would border
on latent hostility toward religion, as it would require government in all
its multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the exclusion
and so to the detriment of the religious. A categorical approach would
install federal courts as jealous guardians of an absolute "wall of
separation," sending a clear message of disapproval.7 '
Justice Kennedy then went on to quote Justice Goldberg in Abington School
District v. Schempp:
It is said, and I agree, that the attitude of government toward religion
must be one of neutrality. But untutored devotion to the concept of
neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not
simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious
which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive
devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the
religious. Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution,
but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it.
Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the
70 The Supreme Court has recently treated Agostini v. Felton's, 521 U.S. 203 (1997),
variation of the Lemon test as a separate and sixth test to be applied in school-aid cases.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 2540 (2000).
"' County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and
worship God and that many of our legal, political and personal values
derive historically from religious teachings. Government must
inevitably take cognizance of the existence of religion. .72
Picking up on Justice Goldberg's comments about the significance of religion
to the American people, Justice Kennedy went on to address how the government
should interact with religion:
The ability of the organized community to recognize and accommodate
religion in a society with a pervasive public sector requires diligent
observance of the border between accommodation and establishment.
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it
may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give
direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact "establishes a
[state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so." These two
principles, while distinct, are not unrelated, for it would be difficult
indeed to establish a religion without some measure of more or less
subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to supply the substantial
benefits that would sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion
to observance, or governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts
in fact to proselytizing. 3
Justice Kennedy went on to further discuss coercion:
It is no surprise that without exception we have invalidated actions that
further the interests of religion through the coercive power of
government. Forbidden involvements include compelling or coercing
participation or attendance at a religious activity, requiring religious
oaths to obtain government office or benefits, or delegating government
power to religious groups. The freedom to worship as one pleases
without government interference or oppression is the great object of both
the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses. Barring all attempts to
aid religion through government coercion goes far toward attainment of
this object. See McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 441 quoting I Annals
of Congress 730 (1789) (James Madison, who proposed the First
Amendment in Congress, "apprehended the meaning of the [Religion
Clauses] to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce
374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
SId. at 659-60 (citations omitted; alterations in the original).
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the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their conscience"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (the Religion Clauses "forestal[l] compulsion by
law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship").74
Justice Kennedy then added comments that in some ways may be his most
direct departure from the "pure" Story view:
As Justice Blackmun observes, ante, at 597-598, n. 47, some of our
recent cases reject the view that coercion is the sole touchstone of an
Establishment Clause violation.... That, may be true if by "coercion" is
meant direct coercion in the classic sense of an establishment of religion
that the Framers knew. But coercion need not be a direct tax in aid of
religion or a test oath. Symbolic recognition or accommodation of
religious faith may violate the Clause in an extreme case. I doubt not,
for example, that the Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall. This is not
because government speech about religion is per se suspect, as the
majority would have it, but because such an obtrusive year-round
religious display would place the government's weight behind an
obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion. Speech
may coerce in some circumstances, but this does not justify a ban on all
government recognition of religion."
However, after discussing the hypotheticals that concerned him, Justice
Kennedy returned to his earlier line of reasoning by quoting Chief Justice Burger
in Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New York:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that
has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either
governmentally established religion or governmental interference with
religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is
room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which
will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference. 6
Justice Kennedy concluded his views as follows:
7" Id at 660 (some citations omitted; alterations in the original).
7' Id. at 660-61 (some citations omitted)
76 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
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This. is most evident where the government's act of recognition! or
accommodation' is passive and symbolic, for in that instance any
intangible benefit -to religion is unlikely to :present a realistic risk of
establishment. Absent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious
liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal. Our cases
reflect this reality by requiring a showing that the symbolic recognition
or accommodation advances religion to such a degree that it actually
"establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.""
While Justice Kennedy no longer seems to hold to his own prior approach and
while this. approach is not currently embraced by a majority of the Court, we
remember that ours is a thirty-year plan. In the meantime, we try to bring as many
cases as possible under Marsh, both in our litigation and in our amicus work. This
is a viable strategy in that Marsh is every bit as much a binding precedent as is
Lemon. Of course, Marsh does not help in situations that, under. our view, are
clearly constitutional and yet have no long historical pedigree. However, we
believe that Marsh does have great applicability in contexts beyond legislative
prayer. For example, we believe that Marsh can be used effectively in religious
display cases. We have~filed many briefs documenting a long-standing tradition of
inscribing religious texts and symbols on public buildings as a form of
acknowledgment, accommodation, and encouragement.
Having decided what an establishment of religion looks like, it becomes clear
that a large part of a proper approach to protecting religious liberty is to vigilantly
guard against mere acknowledgment, accommodation, and encouragement being
falsely characterized as establishment. Once the out-of-control false concept of
establishment is trimhed back to a proper understanding of establishment, any law
or policy that seeks to trample Free Exercise rights will tend to be glaringly
obvious.
For example, no longer will schools have to enact policies that they don't really
want but feel they must adopt for fear of somehow violating the Establishment
Clause.7" In the environment of proper Establishment Clause jurisprudence, in
which Free Exercise violations stick out, there will be no need for a free-exercise-
as-free speech strategy. Indeed, I believe that had Establishment Clause
jurisprudence been true to the text of the Constitution fifteen years age, the strategy
would never have been employed.
SId. at.662 (citation omitted).
7s This was the position, for example of the University of Missouri at Kansas City in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 280 (1981).
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CONCLUSION
In the proper environment, it is possible that the only remaining interesting
question would be the Smith II/RFRA/compelling state interest/hybrid right
question.79 But that would be another essay! Since this issue did not come up
during the Symposium, I will not address it here.
Rather I will end my comments where I began. I would like to thank William
and Mary's Institute of Bill of Rights Law for sponsoring a very enjoyable
Symposium. I know, based upon student comments, that the interaction between
the four panelists provided food for thought to those who attended. As I mentioned
at the outset, they were especially interested in the differences between those of us
who were seen as being "on the same side" of the religion in school issue. I can
only hope that these written comments will provide additional food for thought to
those who might read them.
19 See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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